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MALPRACTICE IMMUNITY FOR THE PHYSICIAN:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, UNFAIR AND UNNECESSARY
LEGISLATION
In August of 1963, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a
law' which purports to abolish a right of action for the negligence
of a physician. The act exempts physicians from civil liability for
malpractice arising from negligent treatment or care rendered at
the scene of an accident or emergency. 2 Gross negligence and acts
or omissions intentionally designed to harm are specifically excluded
from this otherwise blanket immunity. There is no liability for
negligence. Prior to this enactment, the physician would have been
treated the same as any other "Good Samaritan." This law purports
to accord him an immunity which this author believes to be unconstitutional, unfair and unnecessary.
THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The act is unconstitutional in that it abolishes a cause of action for
negligence in complete derogation of the common law and in violation of the Commonwealth's constitution. In the Declaration of
Rights of the Pennsylvania Constitution, every man is guaranteed
a right of action for injury to his person. 3 This has been interpreted
as being a limitation on the powers of the legislature. In Passenger
Railway Co. v. Boudrou,4 in holding limitation of damages to be
unconstitutional, the court said:
12 P.S. § 1641.
2. Any physician . . . who happens by chance upon the scene of an emergency or who arrives on the scene of an emergency by reason of serving on an
emergency call panel or similar committee of a county medical society or who
is called to the scene of an emergency by the police or other duly consituted
officers of the State or a political subdivision or who is present when an emergency
occurs and who, in good faith, renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency, shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions by such physician or practitioner in rendering the emergency care, except
any acts or omissions intentionally designed to harm or any grossly negligent
acts or omissions which result in harm to the person receiving emergency care.
12 P.S. § 1641. Good faith is defined in 12 P.S. § 1642 but is not considered as adding anything to the substantial nature of the law.
3. Pa. Const. art. 1, § 11 provides: All courts shall be open; and every
man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
Article 1 is entitled Declaration of Rights.
denial or delay ....
4. 92 Pa. 475 (1880). See also Dolan v. Linton's Lunch, 397 Pa. 114, 152
A.2d 887 (1959).
1.
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Its authority is in conservation of the reserved right to
every man, that for an injury done him in his person, he shall
have remedy by due course of law. The people have withheld power from the legislature and the courts to deprive
them of that remedy, or to circumscribe it .... 5
To further protect against encroachment on rights of the individual,
the drafters of the constitution provided for the retention of com6
mon law rights of action not inconsistent with that document.
Under the Emergency Acts, damages are denied to one injured by
the negligence of a physician rendering emergency care. A limitation
of damages for personal injury was early held unconstitutional as
violative of the Declaration of Rights in the state's constitution. The
court in the Boudrou7 case said:
Nothing less than the full amount of pecuniary damage
which a man suffers from an injury to him in his lands,
goods or person, fills the measure secured to him in the
Declaration of Rights. As well might it be attempted to
defeat the whole remedy as a part ....
A limitation of recovery to a sum less than the actual damage, is palpably in
conflict with the right to remedy by the due course of law.8
On only one occasion has a limitation of damages been permitted
and this was by constitutional amendment to provide for workmen's
compensation. 9 That amendment specifically and in unambiguous
terms prohibits such limitation in all other cases: ".... but in no other
cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered
for injuries ..... 10 If the General Assembly cannot limit a recovery,
can they circumvent this constitutional prohibition by abolishing the
right of action and in effect say no damages are recoverable? Clearly
they cannot. Language of an early lower court decision which was
affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is most appropriate in
this context:
It would also be a violation of section 21 of Article III,
which says, 'No Act of the Genera'! Assembly shall limit the
amount to be recovered . . . for injuries to persons or prop5. Passenger Railway Co. v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. 475, 481, 482 (1880).
6. Schedule No. 1 (Adopted with the Constitution) § 2 provides: All laws
in force in this Commonwealth at the time of the adoption of this Constitution not
inconsistent therewith, and all rights, actions, prosecutions and contracts shall
continue as if this Constitution had not been adopted.
7. Passenger Railway Co. v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. 475 (1880).
8.

Id. at 482.

9.

Pa. Const. art. 3, § 21 (Amendment of November 2, 1915).

10.

Id.
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erty.' If the Legislature cannot limit the amount of damages
to be recovered, it cannot prohibit an action, for that would
be saying no damages at all shall be recovered.' I
Proponents of "Good Samaritan Immunity" for the physician argue
that physicians refuse to render emergency assistance because of
fears of malpractice actions.' 2 Thus, as a basis for so sweeping an
exercise of legislative power, the act is advanced as an exercise of
police powers in encouraging emergency treatment and aid by physicians. It is readily admitted that under current case law, there is
no duty to be a "Good Samaritan."' 3 However, does the refusal of
some unknown number of physicians to abide by their ethical oath
justify, under a valid exercise of police powers, an encroachment upon
and abrogation of the rights of the overwhelming majority? The
answer must be no.
Rights may be limited in their enjoyment by the legislature acting
under their police powers for purposes of preserving public health,
safety and morals.' 4 In all cases dealing with the exercise of such
broad and all pervasive powers, decisions on the propriety of the
exercise of police powers are couched in terms of limitation.' 5 In all,
the underlying theory is that while a presumption of constitutionality
exists, there must, however, be some reasonable relationship between
11. Flaccus v. Smith, 47 Pitts. 129, 131 (1899), af]'d 199 Pa. 128, 48 Atl. 894
(1901).
12. Kearney, Why Doctors Are "Bad" Samaritans, Reader's Digest, May,
1963.
13. The Pennsylvania Supereme Court in a recent decision said that there
is no duty to go to the rescue of a person in a position of peril. Yania v. Bigan,
397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959). But see Wilmington General Hospital v.
Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (1961) in which the Delaware court speaking of a
private hospital said: "As above indicated, we are of opinion that liability on the
part of a hospital may be predicated on the refusal of service to a patient in case
of an unmistakable emergency, if the patient has relied upon a well-established
custom of the hospital to render aid in such a case ...." See also PROSSER, TORTS,
at 338-9 (3rd ed. 1964), in which he says: "This process of extension [of a
duty] has been slow, and marked with caution; but there is reason to think that
it may continue until it approaches a general holding that the mere knowledge
of serious peril, threatening death or great bodily harm to another, which an
identified defendant might avoid with little inconvenience, creates a sufficient
relation, recognized by every moral and social standard, to impose a duty of
action."
14. Lutz v. Armour, 395 Pa. 576, 151 A.2d 108 (1959); Commonwealth v.
Major, 2 D. & C.2d 150 (1954); Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 101 A.2d
634 (1954).
15. "But, as likewise there stated, the power is not unrestricted; its exercise,
like that of all governmental powers, is subject to constitutional limitations and
judicial review .... " Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 551, 101 A.2d 634
(1954).
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the enactment and some evil to be remedied. 1 6 If an evil does existthe refusal of physicians to render emergency care for fear of malpractice suits-it is still not remedied by the act. There is no duty
to render aid so that a physician can still refuse to become involved.
If the law is to be meaningful, it must be assumed that the physician
knows of its existence. He must also know that he may be susceptible
to malpractice for gross negligence. How will he know that his
treatment will not be construed as grossly negligent and thus not
under the cloak of immunity? If he fears malpractice suits, will he
now become aware of degrees of negligence as a basis for stopping
or not stopping at the scene of an emergency? To say that there is
a chance that some might stop where before they wouldn't have is
just grasping at straws to justify so radical a departure from common law notions of responsibility for negligence.
The law is also unconstitutional as violative of two provisions of
the state's constitution prohibiting class legislation and special immunities.1 7 It is unconstitutional to grant to any class or individual
a special privilege or immunity that all others are denied. Here, the
law grants the cloak of immunity for negligence to physicians only.
Is there any reason why the nurse, policeman or passerby is denied
the same privilege that the doctor is accorded?
These provisions against class legislation were early held to mean
that class legislation is essentially unconstitutional.' 8 Cases involving such legislation have been before the courts on numerous
occasions. ' 9 On one such occasion, the court formulated the appropriate rule as follows:
16. See for example Commonwealth v. Major, 2 D. & C.2d 150, 154 (1954)
wherein the court said: "It is doubtful whether the validity of this ordinanace can
be sustained as an exercise of the broad police power of the borough. For it to
be valid, the courts must be able to see that the enactment has for its object the
prevention of some offense, or manifest evil, or the preservation of the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare."
17. Pa. Const. art. 1, § 17: "No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing
the obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges
or immunities, shall be passed." Pa. Const. art. 3, §7: "The General Assembly
shall not pass any local or special law.... Granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege or immunity ..
"
18. In Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. 266, 281, 16 AtI. 356 (1888) the court said:
"The underlyng principle of all the cases is that classification. . . is
essentially unconstitutional, unless a necessity therefor exists ..
"
19. Clark v. Meade, 377 Pa. 150, 157, 104 A.2d 465 (1954) in which the
court said: "The Act of 1953 clearly grants to Individuals, in violation of the
Article, a special or exclusive privilege or immunity. . .

.";

Kurtz v. Pittsburgh,

346 Pa. 362, 31 A.2d 257 (1943); Laplacca v. Phila. R. T. Co., 68 Pa. Super.
208 (1917), aff'd 265 Pa. 304, 108 Atl. 612 (1919).

COMMENTS

19641

The basis for classification must be reasonable and proper
and founded upon a real, and not merely artificial, distinction
between the members of the class and the general public, and
based upon 'a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities, distinguishing those of one class from each of the other
classes, and imperatively demanding legislation for each
class, separately, that would be useless and detrimental to

others.' . . .20
As will be discussed shortly, it is not only the physician who may be
subjected to liability for rendering emergency assistance. Any Good
Samaritan rendering emergency care in a negligent manner can be
held responsible in damages for his negligence. This being so, what
are the manifest peculiarities to justify class legislation for the physician?
In a somewhat analogous situation, the
Court had before it an enactment granting
a lien for compensation upon their client's
court held the statute to be unconstitutional

Pennsylvania Superior
to attorneys of record
cause of action. 2 1 The
and remarked:

Such grouping is subject, however, to the qualification
that the basis for classification must be reasonable and
proper and founded upon a real, and not merely artificial,
distinction between the members of the class and the general
22
public ...

THE ACT IS UNFAIR
Even if the act could be construed as constitutional, it is, nevertheless, basically unfair. The physician is given all the benefits for
merely doing his job while the truly Good Samaritan is given no
consideration. Under the Restatement of Torts,2 3 one rendering
emergency aid from humanitarian instincts would be held liable for
20.

Kurtz v. Pittsburgh, 346 Pa. 362, 368, 31 A.2d 257 (1943).

21. Laplacca v. Phila. R. T. Co., 68 Pa. Super. 208 (1917), aff'd 265 Pa.
304, 108 Atl. 612 (1919).
22. Laplacca v. Phila. R. T. Co., 265 Pa. 304, 308, 108 Atl. 612 (1919).
23. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 324 (1934) provides as follows: "One who,
being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless adequately
to aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm
caused to him by (a) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to
secure the safety of the other while within the actor's charge; (b) the actor's
discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves the other in a worse
position than when the actor took charge of him."
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his negligence. That Pennsylvania will follow this Section is a rea24
sonable inference based upon strong dicta in a 1955 decision.
The physician who is granted that enviable immunity for his
negligence is highly trained and, in most cases, has the benefit of
some years of experience for rendering of care. If the layman renders
care in the identical negligent manner as the physician, he can be
held liable in damages. It is unfair and greatly disproportionate
that one without medical training is held to a higher duty of care
than one with medical training and experience.
At least one state's "Good Samaritan" law provides immunity only
for the physician rendering gratuitous emergency aid. 2 5 The Pennsylvania counterpart does not require that humanitarian quality of
gratuitousness. Consequently, under traditional applications of
quasi-contractual principles and restitutionary remedies, such a
physician, negligent or not, could recover for the reasonable value
of his services. 2 6 The non-medical Good Samaritan cannot expect
the law to imply a contract for his services regardless of how professional the services might be. The Restatement of Restitution lays
down the rule as follows: " . . . a person who acts entirely from motives of humanity is not entitled to restitution .... -27 Where one
undertakes to do that which he is under no duty to do, he does so
gratuitously and cannot expect to recover for the benefit that may
2s
have been bestowed.
24. In Karavas v. Poulos, 381 Pa. 358, 368, 113 A.2d 300 (1955) the
court said: "Under this section of the Restatement the good Samaritan incurs a
responsibility avoided by those who 'pass by on the other side' .... " Liability was
denied on other grounds.
25.
(1961).

Neb. Laws c. 110, p. 349 (1961).

See also Note, 41 Neb. L. Rev. 609

26. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 114 Comment c (1937).
See also the
following Pennsylvania cases enunciating that principle: McKeehan Estate,
358 Pa. 548, 57 A.2d 907 (1948); Pfeiffer v. Kraske, 139 Pa. Super. 92, 11 A.2d
555 (1939); Gibb's Estate, 266 Pa. 485, 110 Atl. 236 (1920).
27.

RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 114 Comment c (1937).

28. Pascarella v. Kelley, 378 Pa. 18, 105 A.2d 70 (1954), reversed on other
grounds; Etter v. Edwards, 4 Watts 63 (1835); Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20
Johnson 28, 11 Am. Dec. 237, 238 (1822) in which the court announced the
appropriate rule as follows: "The plaintiff performed the service without the
privity or request of the defendant, and there was, in fact, no promise, express or
implied. If a man humanely bestows his labor, and even risks his life, in
voluntarily aiding to preserve his neighbor's house from destruction by fire, the
law considers the service rendered as gratuitous, and it therefore forms no
ground of action .. "
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THE ACT IS UNNECESSARY
The basis for "Good Samaritan Immunity" for the physician is advanced as a method of alleviating his fears of malpractice suits
which it is said holds him back from rendering emergency care when
called upon. 2 9 It is a rather broad assumption that the physician
as a professional man refuses to perform the tasks of his profession
for fear of negligence suits. It might well be that the physician's reluctance to stop at the scene of an accident is that same feature of
human nature that holds most people back from being a "Good
Samaritan." Most refuse to stop at the scene of an accident for
they simply do not want to become involved. This is basic to man as
man and can we say that physicians do not also react to an emergency in the same way?
Risk of malpractice liability in furnishing emergency treatment
has been exaggerated out of all proportion. It is interesting to note
that counsel for the American Medical Association has been quoted
as agreeing with this exaggeration of risk statement. 3 0 A research
of reported cases has failed to disclose one single malpractice suit
anywhere resulting from negligence in rendering emergency care.
Arguably, claims may have been advanced and settled so that no
reported decision would be available. However, the likelihood of all
being settled if in fact so many are presented is, to say the least, incredible. This tends to prove that there is no great incidence, if any,
of malpractice suits arising from rendering of emergency treatment.
If the evil that is supposed to exist really existed-that physicians
refuse to render emergency care from unfounded fears of malpractice
suits--could not the legislature exercise its police powers and prescribe an affirmative duty on the part of physicians to render such
aid when called upon or suffer the revocation of their license? Undoubtedly the legislature could prescribe such a duty consistent with
the high standards demanded by the licensing statutes regulating
physicians. 3 ' After all, the practice of medicine is by license which
is a privilege subject to regulation by the licensor.
In all probabilities, courts would be prone to handle the Good
Samaritan fairly so that this statutory immunity serves no purpose
29.
1963.

Kearney, Why Doctors Are "Bad" Samaritans, Reader's Digest, May,

30.
1964.

Averbach, Good Samaritan Laws, Case and Comment, March - April,

31. 63 P.S. § 405 sets up qualifications for licensure which are rather
demanding. 63 P.S. § 407 prescribes examinations by course and allows the
Board some discretion in determing acceptability for licensure.
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of protection against unfounded suits. A jury composed of ordinary
individuals takes into consideration the exigencies of the situation
and would arrive at a fair and impartial judgment accordingly. This
fear of malpractice suits is unwarranted by the current trend of
case law generally. It is a well known fact that malpractice at best
is most difficult to prove and that there are no great number of suits
instituted in this Commonwealth. Physicians are disinclined to
testify against one another which makes the possibilities even more
remote.

CONCLUSION
Recognizing that an exaggerated and unsupported fear may plague
some small group of physicians, can we warrant so drastic a legislative enactment on what in fact does not exist? We are now struggling
to overcome Charitable Tort Immunity, 32 which has been struck
down or modified out of effectiveness in most jurisdictions. Can we
now afford to embark on an era of "Good Samaritan Immunity"?
And if we do, precedence being what it is, where will it end? Justice
Musmanno put it in words most appropriate:
The Law at one time proclaimed and upheld the rule (proved
a million times wrong) that the king can do no wrong. In
America the rule was changed to read that the government
could do no wrong. Then it was said that hospitals could do
no wrong, but all the while unoffending persons were being
injured, crippled and even killed through the negligence of
government employees and hospital employees; and recovery
was constantly being denied the victims or the victims'
families because of so-called rules of immunity which have
3:
no place in a code of equality and justice. 2
The Emergency Act which proclaims that the physician is immune
in certain cases of wrong doing has no place in our code of equality
and justice.
EDWARD
32.
(1961).
33.

G.

O'CONNOR

Michael v. Hahnemann M.C. & Hospital, 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769
Id. at 457.

